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Abstract: We document a significantly positive relationship between executive compensation 
and risk-taking of Chinese listed banks over the 2007–2018 period. The finding is robust to the 
risk measures (Z-score, systematic risk and stock return volatility) used, the way to calculate 
executive compensation, and model specifications as well as estimation techniques. Further 
analysis suggests that bank past performance (captured by return on equity) strongly moderates 
the relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking. We also find a modest U-shaped 
association of bank Z-score with executive compensation. Our study appears to support the 
regulation on executive compensation for the sake of bank stability. 
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1. Introduction 
The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) has triggered a hot debate on the connection between 
executive compensation and bank risk-taking. Bolton et al. (2015) argue that structuring executive 
incentives to maximize shareholder value in banks tends to encourage excess risk-taking. 
Empirical studies on U.S. banks show that bank risk-taking is positively associated with the 
sensitivity of executive compensation to risk (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Gande and Kalpathy, 2017), 
the incentives generated by executive compensation programs (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014), and the 
percentages of short-term and long-term incentive compensation (Guo et al., 2015). In contrast, 
Shah et al. (2017) uncover a negative relationship between bonuses (restricted share and option 
grants) awarded to bank executives and risk-taking of U.S. banks in the pre-GFC (post-GFC) 
period. Clearly, the literature is inconclusive regarding the connection between executive 
compensation and bank risk-taking. 
Given that bank executive compensation scheme (see Conyon and He, 2011, 2016) and 
governance arrangements (see Fan et al., 2007, 2014) in China differs much from that in the U.S., 
we ask whether and how executive compensation matters for risk-taking of Chinese banks. This 
question is of utmost importance and interest due to the gradually dominating role of Chinese 
banks in the global financial system. According to the Banker’s list of Top 1000 World Banks, 
136 Chinese banks entered the list of which four took the Top 4 spots in terms of their assets.1 
These four banks were also identified as global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) by the 
Financial Stability Board since 2015.2 No doubt, studies about executive compensation and risk-
taking of Chinese banks should have important policy implications not only for bank governance 
and risk management in China but also for the internationally financial regulatory reform. 
However, related studies specially focusing on Chinese banks are surprisingly scarce probably 
because the information about bank executive compensation was not publicly available before. 
Therefore, this paper aims to provide the first evidence for the impact of the level of 
executive compensation on risk-taking of Chinese banks. We document that executive 
compensation has a positive impact on bank risk-taking (proxied by Z-score). The finding is robust 
 
1 See https://www.thebanker.com/Top-1000 for the ranking of 2019 Top 1000 World Banks. 
2  See https://www.fsb.org/2019/11/2019-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/ for the 2019 list of 
global systemically important banks. 
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to model specifications, estimation techniques, executive compensation measures and proxies for 
bank risk-taking. Additional analyses show that: 1) there is a modest U-shaped association of bank 
Z-score with executive compensation; 2) bank performance (captured by return on equity) strongly 
moderates the relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking; and 3) the widely 
examined variables board size and state ownership have insignificant impact on bank Z-score, 
while bank size and ownership concentration significantly and positively affect bank Z-score.  
Our paper is closely related to the recent literature which examines the relationship between 
bank risk-taking and executive compensation. Some research has examined the impact of 
executive compensation on risk-taking of U.S. banks (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2014; Gande and Kalpathy, 2017; Guo et al., 2015; Shah et al., 2017; Tian and Yang, 2014), but 
the impact has not been systemically explored for banks in China. We expand this literature by 
exploring the impact for Chinese banks. Moreover, we uncover the moderated effect of bank past 
performance on the relationship between executive compensation and bank risk-taking. To the best 
of our knowledge, this moderation effect has not been explored in the literature. Our paper also 
belongs to the fast-growing literature on Chinese banks. Recent studies have examined Chinese 
banks from different perspectives, such as systemic risk (e.g., Huang et al., 2019), regulation (e.g., 
Jiang et al., 2019), efficiency (Zhang et al., 2012), political connection (Hung et al., 2017), 
ownership dispersion of banks (Bian and Deng, 2017). We contribute to this literature by providing 
empirical evidence for the connection of executive compensation and bank risk-taking, which is 
beneficial to China’s current regulation practice and improvement. 
2. Methodology and data 
To examine the impact of executive compensation on bank risk-taking, we start from the following 
two-way fixed effects panel regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,  (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+1 and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 indicate bank i’s risk-taking and executive compensation in 
year t+1, respectively; 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 includes a series of control variables; 𝜆𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖 denote year and 
bank fixed effects, respectively; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), 
we use the natural logarithm of the Z-score (ln 𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) as our main measure for bank risk-taking. 
A bank’s Z-score equals the sum of its return on assets (ROA) and equity-to-asset ratio divided by 
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the standard deviation of ROA, such that a lower Z-score indicates that the bank is riskier. As a 
robustness check, we employ two market-based risk measures, systematic risk (Beta) and total risk 
(Volatility), as proxies for bank risk-taking. Beta, estimated from the capital asset pricing model, 
captures the reaction of bank stock returns to the movements of the stock market index, while 
Volatility is the standard deviation of bank stock returns. Both measures are calculated for each 
bank on the basis of daily stock returns within a year. 
For the key explanatory variable 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, we use the natural logarithm of the 
aggregate annual compensation of the top three executives (ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤3𝐸𝑥𝑒) as our main analysis. 
For sensitivity analysis, we also calculate the natural logarithm of the aggregate annual 
compensation of the top three directors (ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤3𝐷𝑖𝑟) and of the top three executives plus the top 
three directors (ln 𝑅𝑒𝑤3𝐸𝑥𝑒3𝐷𝑖𝑟). To control for variables that may have impact on bank risk-
taking, we consider the following variables: 1) bank size captured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets ( ln 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 ); 2) solvency captured by equity-to-liability ratio (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝐿𝑖𝑎 ); 3) ownership 
concentration of the top five shareholders (OwnCon); 4) return on equity (ROE); 5) board size 
defined as the number of directors (BoardSize); 6) state shares percentage (StateshrPct); 7) the 
natural logarithm of net profit (ln 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡); and, 8) yearly growth of a bank’s total assets 
(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ). These variables are widely adopted in bank literature (e.g., Bhagat et al., 2015; 
Bian and Deng, 2017; Gormley et al., 2012; Haq and Heaney, 2012; Laeven and Levine, 2009). In 
addition to these variables, we include both time and bank fixed effects to relieve the concern of 
omitted variables. 
We estimate Eq. (1) with the key explanatory and control variables lagged on period along 
with time and bank fixed effects to mitigate possible endogeneity and omitted bias (c.f. Bai et al., 
2019). Moreover, each continuous variable is winsorized at its 1st and 99th percentiles before 
running our regressions to guard against the potential effects of outliers. In addition, we apply the 
stepwise regression with backward elimination approach to remove insignificant variables to avoid 
serious multicollinearity. To further address possible endogeneity bias due to inverse causality 
between some covariates and the dependent variable, we also estimate Eq. (1) with the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) procedure and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel 
methodology to obtain consistent estimates, as suggested by Bai and Elyasiani (2013) and 
Altunbaş et al. (2019). 
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Our dataset includes the 16 largest banks listed in the Chinese stock market where their 
aggregate assets account for more than 70% of the total assets of all Chinese commercial banks 
(Huang et al., 2019). Our main analysis focuses on the period of 2007–2018 as the Chinese banking 
restructuring reform was basically completed at the end of 2006 (Huang et al., 2019) whereas data 
on bank executive compensation in 2019 has not been released yet. We collect data for the above 
variables from the RESSET database and present their descriptive statistics in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
lnZscore 191 3.628 .377 2.39 4.525 
Volatility 186 .02 .009 .007 .045 
 Beta 186 .859 .274 .152 1.761 
lnRew3Exe 178 15.627 .652 14.245 17.236 
lnRew3Dir 178 15.474 .756 13.305 17.362 
lnRew3Exe3Dir 178 16.266 .668 15.018 17.929 
lnAssets 192 28.708 1.297 25.048 30.952 
EquLia 192 6.638 2.097 -12.06 15.037 
OwnCon 188 .635 .238 .246 1 
ROE 189 17.845 4.626 4.176 41.125 
BoardSize 187 20.802 4.135 11 33 
StateshrPct 188 7.999 18.754 0 100 
lnNetProfit 192 24.057 1.373 20.236 26.419 
AssetGrowth 192 19.173 12.384 -4.272 73.015 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables used in our paper. lnZscore is the natural 
logarithm of Z-score. Volatility is the standard deviation of bank stock returns. Beta captures the reaction of bank 
stock returns to the movements of the stock market index. lnRew3Exe and lnRew3Dir are the natural logarithm of 
rewards to the Top 3 executives and the Top 3 directors, respectively. lnRew3Exe3Dir is the natural logarithm of total 
rewards to the Top 3 executives and the Top 3 directors. lnAssets is the natural logarithm of bank assets. EquLia 
indicates the equity-to-liability ratio. OwnCon is the sum of shares percentage of the Top 5 shareholders. ROE is return 
on equity. BoardSize is the number of directors. StateshrPct is the percentage of state shares. lnNetProfit is the natural 
logarithm of net profit. AssetGrowth is yearly growth of a bank’s total assets. Data source: RESSET (www.resset.com). 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents the results about the impact of executive compensation on bank risk-taking. 
We start from the investigation of the linear impact of executive compensation with different 
estimation techniques. Then we examine whether the impact could be nonlinear and whether the 
impact persists for other risk measures. At last, we explore whether the impact is affected by other 
bank characteristics. 
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Table 2. Baseline results on executive compensation and bank risk-taking 
    Fixed effects 2SLS  GMM 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
lnRew3Exe -0.080** -0.063**   -0.081** -0.082** 
 (-2.619) (-2.328)   (-2.103) (-2.161) 
lnAssets 0.266*** 0.293*** 0.277*** 0.273*** -0.009 -0.007 
 (4.021) (3.544) (4.280) (4.207) (-0.525) (-0.414) 
EquLia 0.120*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.204*** 0.205*** 
 (6.377) (6.558) (6.039) (6.266) (13.887) (13.994) 
OwnCon 0.579** 0.451* 0.566** 0.575** 0.115 0.101 
 (2.700) (1.772) (2.569) (2.689) (1.063) (0.954) 
ROE 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (3.093) (3.302) (3.097) (3.073) (4.650) (4.914) 
BoardSize  0.000     
  (0.075)     
StateshrPct  -0.001     
  (-1.034)     
lnNetProfit  -0.058     
  (-0.603)     
AssetGrowth  0.000     
  (0.088)     
lnRew3Dir   -0.055*    
   (-2.084)    
lnRew3Exe3Dir    -0.086**   
    (-2.788)   
β0 -4.265* -3.832* -4.984** -4.321** 3.368*** 3.330*** 
   (-2.094) (-1.981) (-2.424) (-2.147) (4.299) (4.264) 
 Obs. 176 173 177 176 169 169 
 R-squared  0.936 0.942 0.934 0.936 0.518 0.518 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes     
Hansen (P-value)     0.489 0.489 
Notes: This table reports estimation results of Eq. (1) under different specifications by different estimation techniques. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. The independent variables are lagged with one-year in 
models (1) to (4), which are panel regressions with fixed effects. Models (5) and (6) are estimated using the 2SLS and 
GMM approaches, respectively, with robust standard errors during the same period. The Hansen J statistic tests the 
validity of the instruments used with the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals, and 
rejection of the hypothesis implies that the instruments are not valid. The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, 
** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 2 presents the baseline results of our fixed effects model (see Eq. 1) compared with 
those estimated with the 2SLS and GMM techniques. Model (1) is the estimates recommended by 
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the stepwise regression with backward elimination approach. We find that the coefficient of 
lnRew3Exe is -0.08, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. As the dependent variable 
(lnZscore) indicates the distance from default, the results of Model (1) suggest that bank risk-
taking is positively associated with executive compensation. The coefficients of the four control 
variables included in Model (1) have expected signs and are significant, suggesting that higher 
values in bank size (lnAssets), solvency (EquLia), ownership concentration (OwnCon) and 
performance (ROE) result in lower bank risk. Model (2) shows that the above findings remain 
unchanged when controlling for more variables widely chosen in related studies. Models (3) and 
(4) show that our findings still hold when we change the way to measure executive compensation. 
Models (5) and (6) apply the 2SLS and GMM techniques to address possible endogeneity and the 
estimates show that the impact of executive compensation on bank risk-taking remain significant. 
Overall, Models (2)-(6) appear to support our finding drawn from Model (1) that executive 
compensation has a significant and positive impact on bank risk-taking. 
Our finding is supported by the theoretical analysis of Bolton et al. (2015) and in line with 
the findings of several studies on U.S. banks (see Bhagat and Bolton, 2014; Gande and Kalpathy, 
2017; Guo et al., 2015), but contrary to the findings of Shah et al. (2017). Given that the literature 
is inconclusive as to the effect of executive compensation on bank risk-taking, we further examine 
whether there might be a nonlinear relationship between executive compensation and bank risk-
taking, and whether the relationship holds when risk is captured differently. To this end, on the 
basis of Model (1) shown in Table 2, we add a squared term of executive compensation 
(lnRew3Exe) to the model and rerun the regression. The results are shown in Column (1) of Table 
3. The coefficients of lnRew3Exe and its squared term are only significant at the 10% level. The 
results suggest that executive compensation has a modest nonlinear effect on bank risk-taking 
captured by Z-score. When we employ the market-based risk measures (Volatility and Beta) as 
proxies for bank risk-taking, the nonlinear effect of executive compensation is not observed, see 
Columns (3) and (5) of Table 3. In contrast, the linear effect is evident. Results shown in Columns 
(2) and (4) of Table 3 suggest that banks’ total risk (Volatility) and systematic risk (Beta) are 
significantly and positively associated with executive compensation. Overall, these results appear 
to support our main finding drawn from Table 2. 
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Table 3. Additional results for nonlinear effects and market-based risk measures 
Dependent variable    lnZscore Volatility Volatility    Beta    Beta 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
lnRew3Exe -1.706* 0.002** -0.005 0.093* 0.474 
   (-1.863) (2.304) (-0.253) (1.990) (0.362) 
lnRew3Exe×lnRew3Exe 0.053* 
 
0.000 
 
-0.012 
   (1.813)  (0.335)  (-0.290) 
lnAssets 0.268*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.047 -0.048 
   (4.432) (-3.047) (-3.057) (-0.538) (-0.540) 
EquLia 0.117*** -0.000 -0.000 0.019 0.020 
   (6.000) (-1.202) (-1.221) (0.788) (0.845) 
OwnCon 0.565** 0.001 0.001 -0.394* -0.391*  
(2.769) (0.219) (0.207) (-1.868) (-1.854) 
ROE 0.024*** -0.000 -0.000 0.008 0.009 
   (3.105) (-0.474) (-0.486) (1.035) (1.061) 
β0 8.207 0.128*** 0.174 0.722 -2.205 
   (1.048) (3.143) (1.191) (0.295) (-0.225) 
 Obs. 176 176 176 176 176 
 R-squared  0.938 0.924 0.924 0.744 0.744 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: This table reports estimation results of Eq. (1) under different specifications with fixed effects. The numbers 
in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
To understand through which channel executive compensation affects bank risk-taking, we 
expand Model (1) shown in Table 2 with the interactions of executive compensation with the 
selected control variables and rerun the regressions. Before adding the interaction terms, we 
demean the variables to be interacted following the suggestion of Balli and Sørensen (2013). For 
instance, the interaction of executive compensation with ROE (D_lnRew3Exe×ROE) is calculated 
by the difference of lnRew3Exe and its mean multiplied by the difference of ROE and its mean. In 
this way, models with interaction terms are more robust and interpretative (Balli and Sørensen, 
2013). Table 4 presents the estimates of our baseline model augmented with interaction terms.  
Column (1) shown in Table 4 is simply copied from Table 2 for easy comparison. We 
include the interaction terms of executive compensation with bank size, equity-to-liability ratio, 
ownership concentration and ROE to Column (1) and the results are presented in Columns (2) to 
(5) of Table 4, respectively. We find that only the interaction with ROE is statistically significant. 
The results suggest that if a bank achieves its average ROE, the effect of executive compensation 
on bank risk-taking is not affected, see Column (5) compared with Column (1). However, if a bank 
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performs better relative to its historical average ROE, the effect of executive compensation on 
bank risk-taking would be enlarged, and vice versa. An intuitive story behind these results may be 
that bank executives are more confident and willing to take more risk if they help the bank to earn 
more in the past. However, if the bank performs worse than in the past, they will be more risk-
averse probably due to the pressure from financial supervisors or bank shareholders who would 
force them to reduce bank risk. A deeper investigation on executive characteristics would be 
helpful for understanding the connection between executive compensation and bank risk-taking 
and promoting bank governance, while this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 4: Interaction effects of executive compensation with bank characteristics 
  (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
lnRew3Exe -0.080** -0.082** -0.080** -0.076** -0.080** 
   (-2.619) (-2.732) (-2.534) (-2.489) (-2.847) 
lnAssets 0.266*** 0.268*** 0.264*** 0.269*** 0.267*** 
   (4.021) (4.089) (3.997) (4.063) (4.455) 
EquLia 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
   (6.377) (6.469) (6.354) (6.385) (6.481) 
OwnCon 0.579** 0.559** 0.604** 0.500** 0.420* 
   (2.700) (2.555) (2.639) (2.914) (1.990) 
ROE 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
   (3.093) (3.026) (3.086) (3.044) (3.200) 
D_lnRew3Exe×lnAssets  0.029    
    (0.748)    
D_lnRew3Exe×EquLia   -0.017   
     (-0.815)   
D_lnRew3Exe×OwnCon5    -0.562  
      (-1.567)  
D_lnRew3Exe×ROE     -0.021*** 
       (-2.976) 
β0 -4.265* -4.317** -4.258* -4.357** -4.182** 
   (-2.094) (-2.142) (-2.056) (-2.138) (-2.372) 
 Obs. 176 176 176 176 176 
 R-squared  0.936 0.936 0.936 0.937 0.939 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: This table reports estimation results of Eq. (1) with the inclusion of interaction terms of executive compensation 
with control variables used in the models. Before adding the interaction terms, we demean the variables to be interacted 
following the suggestion of Balli and Sørensen (2013). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of Z-score. 
The numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper examines whether and how executive compensation matter bank risk-taking in China. 
Using Z-score, systematic risk and stock return volatility as three proxies for bank risk-taking, we 
uncover a positive relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking for Chinese banks. 
This finding is similar to several studies for U.S. banks (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2014; Gande and Kalpathy, 2017; Guo et al., 2015). In addition, we find that the 
relationship between executive compensation and risk-taking is positively moderated by bank past 
performance, which therefore calls for attention to bank performance when reforming executive 
compensation system for the sake of bank stability. As for future research on Chinese banks, one 
may proceed to explore the mechanisms of executive compensation’s effects and investigate the 
structure of compensation in detail when more data are released. 
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